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In the presence of large international disturbances small open economies are faced 
with difficult policy choices. International conditions impact on domestic 
outcomes. Using a structural VAR model of the Australian economy I explore the 
ways in which domestic monetary policy contributes to the output outcomes 
experienced in the economy. The focus is on the impact of international shocks. 
Monetary policy is modelled using a cash rate response to GNE, inflation and real 
exchange rate shocks. The results show that removing the focus on either GNE or 
inflation leads to lower GDP outcomes for the economy. The challenge for 
domestic policy is to recognise and respond to international and domestic shocks 
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1. Introduction 
The Australian economy has almost all the features of a classic small open economy; it is 
open to trade, capital flows, and (albeit limited) migration. It possesses virtually no 
pricing power in international markets, although occasionally conditions in primary 
markets can have an influence on international prices. It has also maintained a floating 
exchange rate since late 1983, and operates with very limited regulations on international 
or domestic capital allocation. 
A consequence of Australia’s lack of impact on international economic conditions is that 
the economy is perceived as widely influenced by external factors. This has been 
empirically verified in a number of influential studies, many of which originate from 
policy-making bodies such as the central bank and Treasury. A common way of proxying 
external influences on the Australian economy has been as a simple relationship between 
either the US economy or an OECD average and domestic factors – for example, Gruen 
and Sheutrim (1994), Beechey et al (2000), The Treasury Model and The Murphy Model 
(MM2) where the small open economy assumption is invoked
1.  
However, although external conditions play a large part in determining Australian 
economic outcomes, the role of domestic policy is crucial.  The domestic policy settings 
of the economy can cause international shocks to be either dampened or amplified – this 
is an important role for domestic policy in economies heavily influenced by external 
events over which they have minimal influence. In fact, this may mean that small open 
                                                 
1 There are also a number of studies that do not invoke the small open economy assumption, such as 
Summers (1999), Weber (1994), Smith and Murphy (1994) and Moreno (1992).  2 
economies need to devote proportionately more rather than fewer resources to domestic 
policy than do influential economies. Domestic policy setting may actually be more 
difficult in this situation, in ways that are not yet well understood (Fraser (2001), Ball 
(2000), Taylor (2000), Fagan and Weber (1994)). Not only do domestic policy settings 
have to be constructed for effective domestic operations in times of calm, they also need 
to be able to both handle and disburse the turmoil which can arise from international 
events. However, this is not a debate limited to small or developing economies, as the 
empirical debate as to the appropriate role of the US Federal Reserve in muting the 1974 
oil price shock shows; see Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997) and Hamilton and 
Herrera (2001).  
In this paper I examine the influence of external conditions on the Australian economy in 
the 1990s using an updated version of the structural VAR model given in Dungey and 
Pagan (2000). This model uses the US economy as the proxy for external conditions. The 
conclusions are similar to those from a model including a larger range of external 
economies, Dungey and Fry (2001). The influence of external conditions is almost 
equivalent to that of domestic influences in contributing to prevailing domestic economic 
outcomes. In more detailed decompositions, however, the importance of domestic 
conditions becomes more evident, particularly around turning points in the world 
economic cycle.  
As evidence of the importance of domestic policy settings the Australian economy’s 
response to the East Asian crisis is considered. A significant proportion of Australia’s 
direct trading partners experienced periods of negative growth following the crisis. How, 
then do we explain the relatively good Australian experience? One answer may lie with  3 
the management of the domestic economy – allowing the shock absorbers of a developed 
and liquid financial sector to adjust and cushion the real economy, and providing fiscal 
relief to aid the redistribution of resources required by this external shocks. It also seems 
likely that good luck had some part in the outcome, with asset price rises cushioning the 
impact. Gruen (2000) notes that monetary policy was allowed more ‘latitude’ in this 
period than earlier incidents.  
This is not an unmitigated applause of domestic monetary and fiscal policy during this 
period – however, it does demonstrate that domestic policy has an important role to play 
in managing the domestic economy in the face of dominant external shocks. A counter 
example of unsuccessful domestic policy response in the face of external shocks would 
be to adopt the attitude that the influence of international events is so overwhelming that 
there is no gain from domestic policy. This point is distinct from a deliberate policy of 
inaction, which has been given due consideration. Recently, The Economist (2001) has 
accused East Asian economies of something similar in their lack of banking sector 
reform; see also Summers (2000). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature on 
external influences on the Australian economy. Section 3 outlines the basic components 
of the models to be used, although the detail is contained in the source papers. In Section 
4 we decompose the contributions of domestic and international shocks on Australian 
economic performance in the 1990s particularly. Some simulations then illustrate the 
effects of a number of external shocks based on this past experience in Section 5, and 
with some modifications to the model we examine the composition of domestic policy 
settings in more detail in Section 6. The construction of the models means that the focus  4 
is on monetary policy. Section 7 examines in more detail the East Asian crisis experience 
for Australia and Section 8 concludes. 
2. The Literature 
The influence of international economic conditions on the domestic economy is quite 
substantial. Some examples of the literature on this issue are contained in the volumes by 
Perkins (1968), Veale (1980) and Meredith and Dyster (1998). However, in this paper we 
concentrate on the financially deregulated environment of the 1980s onwards, and for 
policy purposes mainly on the 1990s.  
Australia has long been a producer of structural macroeconomic modelling, including 
models run by the Treasury (the NIF series, and currently TRYM) and the RBA (the 
RBA series of models and relatively recently the re-emergence of modelling documented 
first in de Brouwer and O’Reagan (1997) and most recently Beechey et al (2000)). There 
are also a number of non-government models, the Monash model (formerly ORANI), and 
the Murphy Model suite of models (the basic structure of which can be found in Murphy 
and Powell (1996)). In these models the international economy is exogenous – and its 
influences are imported directly into the Australian economy. In contrast, the models 
associated with Warwick McKibbin contain interdependent models of economies. 
A number of single equation studies of the influence of international activity on 
Australian output also exist. The most influential have probably been those originating 
from the Reserve Bank of Australia. In particular, the output equation in Gruen and 
Sheutrim (1994) which uses OECD output. The current RBA model also includes a single  5 
equation estimation of Australian output evolution involving exogenously determined 
international activity.  
Complementing the single equation and structural models are a number of VAR models. 
The first Australian VAR seems to be an early attempt by Trevor and Thorpe in 1988. 
However, subsequent research on the economy wide scale was hampered by the massive 
structural change to the economy as a result of the financial deregulation of the early 
1980s. Not until the mid-1990s were there enough data points to make this method more 
useful for economy-wide modelling in Australia. Since then a number of studies have 
been undertaken, including Moreno (1992), Weber (1994), Fisher (1996), Huh (1999), 
Brischetto and Voss (1999), Summers (1999, 2001), Dungey and Pagan (2000), Suzuki 
(2001),Willard, Voss and Zha (2001).
2 
In this paper we examine the impact of international economic conditions on the 
Australian economy using results derived from the VAR literature. In particular we take 
an updated version of Dungey and Pagan (2000) to decompose the influences on the 
Australian economic cycle over the 1990s and examine the role of domestic monetary 
policy. The model is then used to examine the results of international shocks from a 
series of experiments changing domestic policy settings. 
3. VAR Models 
The basic tools of VAR modelling are well documented elsewhere, see Hamilton (1994) 
for example, and are beyond the scope of this paper. However, for clarity it is worth  6 
restating that VAR model relates variables through their data characteristics rather than 
structurally. Hence we can write a vector of variables, yt, in reduced form as: 
  t t t e y ) L ( A y + = −"  (1) 
where et is a vector of reduced form errors, uncorrelated across equations. Equation (1)  
can then be rewritten as an autoregressive process in the error term. 
 conditions   initial e ) L ( C y t t + = −"  (2) 
where C represents the impulse response functions and the initial conditions depend on 
the lag structure of the model. Equation (2) provides a number of useful ways of 
decomposing the final result including the impulse response functions and the historical 
decomposition, which will be used in section 4 below. 
The models used in this paper are slight variations on the basic VAR model outlined 
above. In the most basic structural VAR (SVAR) a Wold ordering is imposed on the 
contemporaneous variables in addition to normalization. This system will be exactly 
identified. Alternatives are then to exactly identify the model using some other schematic. 
One alternative is to have overidentified models. In the models presented here the Wold 
ordering of the standard SVAR analysis is retained, but some elements of that matrix are 
set to zero - that is extra restrictions are imposed. In addition, some structure is placed on 
the matrices of coefficients on the lagged variables. For details on the exact identification 
see Dungey and Pagan (2000).  
                                                                                                                                                 
2 There are many other VAR studies on Australian data; here I have concentrated on those which have 
attempted to model the entire economy. I have deliberately excluded all two and three variable models as 
irrelevant to the current discussion.  7 
The Dungey and Pagan model contains two sectors, international and domestic. The 
former contains 5 variables- US real output, the Australian terms of trade, US real 90 day 
interest rates, a Tobin’s Q variable for the US and Australian exports – the domestic 
sector includes a Tobin’s Q variable for Australia 
3 real GNE, real GDP, inflation, the 
cash rate and the real trade weighted index of the Australian dollar (real TWI). All data is 
quarterly, all variables except the Tobin’s Q, interest rates and inflation rates are in 
logarithms and with the exception of the domestic inflation rate have been detrended. The 
estimation approach is standard and a range of impulse response functions are reported in 
Dungey and Pagan. 
The structure of the model relates to empirical and theoretical results previously existing 
for Australian data. The full details are given in Dungey and Pagan, but a broad overview 
of the restrictions relating to the interaction between international and domestic 
economies is beneficial here. A small open economy assumption is applied in the model 
by imposing block exogeneity on the international sector, so that Australian economic 
conditions do not impact on the US economy. The literature is somewhat divided here; 
earlier VAR models of Australia such as Weber (1994), Smith and Murphy (1994) and 
Moreno (1992) had full recursivity. More recently, Suzuki (2001) finds that the empirical 
evidence does not support the small open economy restriction and Summers (1999, 2001) 
reports feedbacks. Brischetto and Voss (1999) and Willard, Voss and Zha (2001) both 
impose the small open economy restriction. Although there may well be feedbacks, they 
                                                 
3 The USQ is constructed as the Dow Jones Index deflated by the Consumer Price Index, and AUSQ as the 
All Ordinaries Index deflated by the Investment Price Deflator series from the National Accounts data – see 
Dungey and Pagan (2000) for exact data definitions.  8 
are likely to be relatively small, and the lack of an exogeneity restriction has led to some 
odd responses in the models (as acknowledged in Suzuki (2001), see also Weber (1994)).  
The international sector of the model has a number of restrictions. Importantly, the US 
economy does not to respond to the Australian terms of trade, although the terms of trade 
reacts to the US economy. This reflects the differing structures of the two economies. 
Australian exports are deemed to react to the real US economy, but not directly to the US 
financial variables of USQ and the real US interest rate.  
The domestic economy has a restricted path of reaction to changes in the US economy. 
The transmission mechanism for US GDP shocks to the Australian economy comes 
directly through Australian GDP and investment and financial market conditions as 
represented by AUSQ and the real TWI. Similarly, exports enter only into Australian 
GDP. The US financial sector enters directly only into AUSQ via USQ, and to the real 
TWI via USQ and the real US interest rate. Neither US financial sector conditions, nor 
the real economy directly impact either Australian inflation, GNE or the cash rate. This is 
not to say that contemporaneous effects of shocks to US variables will not be felt in those 
domestic variables, but rather that they are transmitted through their relationship with 
contemporaneous Australian GDP. Changes in the terms of trade, however, impact 
contemporaneously on all Australian variables with the exception of the cash rate. The 
lag structure is somewhat less constrained, but retains the restriction that the Australian 
cash rate does not respond to international variables directly (inflation, however, has a 
direct link with the terms of trade).  9 
The other important feature of the model is the constraint on the impact of changes in the 
cash rate. To capture the lags between monetary policy action and changes in economic 
conditions, alterations in cash rates do not impact Australian GNE, GDP or inflation for 
two periods after they are enacted. They do, however, affect the exchange rate 
immediately. 
A selection of results from this model was reported in Dungey and Pagan (2000). The 
following reports results from an updated data set and expands the analysis of the impact 
of the international sector on the Australian economy. 
4. The 1990s Re-examined 
 
Dungey and Pagan (2000) report results from a data period spanning 1980 to September 
1998. In this paper the data period is extended to June 2000. A standard result often 
reported in VAR studies is the forecast error variance decomposition for the variables of 
interest. This decomposition aims to illuminate which shocks were on average 
responsible for the observed variance in a particular variable over differing forecast 
horizon. The variance decomposition for Australian GDP is presented in Table 1. 
The results in Table 1 support the primary importance of domestic shocks in determining 
the outcome for Australian GDP, particularly the importance of GDP shocks themselves. 
However, the strong influence of international shocks is also evident. At the one year 
forecast horizon these account for around 30 percent of total variance in GDP, and almost 
45 percent at a 3 year horizon. The decompositions also show that the reclassification of 
the RTWI as an international rather than domestic variable makes little difference to the  10 
overall tenure of the results. Given that the exchange rate has a role as a stabilising 
influence this result is expected.  
Table 1: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition for Australian GDP 
Shock    Contributions at forecast horizons     
  1 4 8  12 
USGDP  0.015 0.116 0.208 0.228 
TOT  0.012 0.031 0.047 0.045 
RUS  0.000 0.007 0.053 0.061 
USQ  0.000 0.026 0.060 0.052 
EXP  0.185 0.141 0.073 0.061 
Total  Internat  0.212 0.321 0.441 0.447 
AUSQ  0.011 0.031 0.024 0.020 
GDP  0.571 0.545 0.421 0.364 
GNE  0.206 0.071 0.036 0.030 
INF  0.000 0.010 0.008 0.007 
CASH  0.000 0.002 0.055 0.120 
RTWI  0.000 0.019 0.015 0.012 
Total  domestic  0.788 0.678 0.535 0.553 
International 
with RTWI 
0.212 0.340 0.456 0.459 
Domestic with 
no RTWI 
0.718 0.659 0.520 0.521  11 
 
Unfortunately, the forecast error variance decomposition can be quite misleading. In the 
presence of over-identifying restrictions in the VAR, such as in this model, the 
assumption that the individual error terms are orthogonal is usually violated. It is difficult 
to know what effect this has on the decomposition. In addition the average nature of the 
statistic detracts from information about the dynamics of the decomposition over the 
business cycle. A more informative alternative is to decompose the estimated fitted value 
for the series of interest into its component shocks, as per equation (2). Figure 1 
represents the decomposition of detrended Australian GDP over the estimation period, 
with the shocks broadly classified into domestic and international as above. The 
horizontal zero axis represents the trend in Australian GDP, so that observations above 
the line represent above trend Australian GDP. The vertical bars represent the total 
contributions of the international and domestic components of the model to making up 
the GDP figure (that is the sum of the columns represents the value of the line on the 
chart). Hence, for example, in 1985-86, the domestic factors (which are black) contribute 
positively to GDP, but the GDP outcome is reduced by the negative international effects 
(which are given in grey). This decomposition provides a useful tool for analysis. 
The course of the last two decades provides some interesting outcomes. The early 1980s 
recession is clearly primarily a domestically driven problem, the contribution of 
international shocks is relatively less – perhaps reflecting the impact of the drought 
conditions at the time. Domestic shocks continued to impact negatively on growth in the 
mid-1980s, so that the slowdown in 1986 was due to a lower positive contribution from 
international factors than previous years. This is consistent with the definition of the  12 
terms of trade as an international shock, and if the decomposition is further refined the 
1986 slowdown is clearly associated with the terms of trade (see for example figure 23 in 
Dungey and Pagan (2000)).   
In the late 1980s and early 1990 domestic factors were the driving force for the higher 
than trend GDP, while international factors were acting against this trend. Both 
international and domestic factors contributed to the slowdown in the early 1990s, and 
international factors did not cumulatively make a positive impact to Australian GDP until 
the late 1990s. The recovery of GDP to above trend growth again in 1997 was mainly due 
to domestic factors (mainly due to GNE shocks in the model), but particularly from late 
1998 onwards, international factors played an important role in sustaining the boom in 
domestic output.  
Although this decomposition provides an interesting story it also disguises some of the 
detail of how the economy was behaving in this period. Figures 2 and 3 provide the 
individual contributions of the international factors to detrended Australian GDP in the 
1990s. Figures 4 and 5 give the contributions of the domestic factors. From Figures 2 and 
3 it is apparent that the predominantly negative international effect until the mid-1990s 
was broadly based across the international indicators, with the exception of the real US 
interest rate, which was contributing to higher domestic output. In the late 1990s 
domestic output is sustained by USQ shocks, representing the rapid growth in US share 
markets in particular, and US GDP, following a period of strong international output 
growth.  13 
However, it is apparent from a comparison of Figures 2 to 5 that the largest single 
contributors to the detrended GDP decomposition in the late 1990s are domestic GNE 
and GDP. In the summation of the domestic forces their contribution is diminished by the 
small negative contributions of the remaining domestic variables. This more detailed 
story is consistent with our experience of the recovery from the 1990s recession. 
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Having characterised the path of Australian output over the past 20 years, and established 
that international effects have an extremely important role to play in determining the 
outcomes for domestic output we turn now to the impact of international shocks on the 
economy. Using the characteristics of the model outlined in this section we examine the 
resulting paths for the Australian economy, focussing particularly on domestic output and 
inflation. In the following section we examine the implied monetary policy responses to 
these shocks, and experiment with alternative response functions to analyse the impact of 
domestic monetary policy on the Australian economy. 
5. International Shocks Transmitted to the Domestic Economy 
Table 2: One standard deviation shocks 
Variable   Variable  
USGDP 0.78%  USQ  8.08% 
TOT 2.21%  EXP 3.99% 
RUS  118 basis points     
 
There are five potential international shocks to the Australian economy in this model, 
associated with USGDP, the terms of trade, real US interest rates, USQ and exports. This 
section deals with each in turn. However, we note initially that the structure of the model 
is such that much of the initial impact will be felt through the relationships between the 
domestic variables and US GDP. Contemporaneous relationships between the domestic 
variables and the international variables are relatively limited. The real TWI is the least  16 
restricted, relating to all contemporaneous variables except exports. Australian GDP is 
related directly to US GDP, the terms of trade and exports contemporaneously and AUSQ 
is related to US GDP, the terms of trade and USQ contemporaneously. Of the other 
domestic variables GNE and inflation only respond to the terms of trade 
contemporaneously and the cash rate is constrained to relate only to domestic variables 
(this is in contrast to other VAR literature for Australia such as Suzuki (2001)). Given 
this structure it is of interest to see how strongly the international shocks are transmitted 
to the domestic economy. Table 2 gives the size of the one standard deviation shocks 
applied in the analysis. 
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Figures 6 and 7 represent the impact of a USGDP shock on Australian output and 
inflation. The impact of a 0.78% shock in USGDP on Australian GDP is initially a 0.1% 
contemporaneous increase. Four quarters after the shock the cumulative impact on 
Australian GDP has been for a 1.2% increase in output. The shock results in increases in 
Australian GDP for some 4.5 years, before returning below trend. The results for inflation 
are initially perverse, a feature also in Dungey and Pagan (2000) but found to be 
insignificant
4. Despite the higher growth, inflation is restrained by the actions of the 
monetary authority in increasing the cash rate, by 250 basis points in the first 3 years 
following the shock. 
A positive terms of trade shock could be associated with either an increase in export 
prices or a decrease in import prices. Here, the associated appreciation of the Australian 
currency supports the view that the shock is driven by export price increases rather than 
increased demand for imports. The appreciation of the currency also leads to a lower 
inflationary outcome (Figure 9). It will be of some interest to see if this feature is 
maintained in future updates of the model, given that there seems to have been far less 
exchange rate pass through in recent years than in the early part of the estimation period 
(Dwyer and Leong (2001)). 
The role of a shock to real US interest rates is more difficult to analyse as the variable 
comprises a composite of US interest rates and inflation. A rise in real interest rates may 
be achieved by tighter US monetary policy, or by decreased US inflation. The real US 
interest rate does not enter directly into any domestic variable except the real exchange 
                                                 
4 As with most VAR applications the confidence for the impulse response functions are wide. They are not 
presented here in the interests of preserving space.   18 
rate. However, the responses shown in Figures 10 and 11 are consistent with the rise in 
the US real interest rate, which causes a decline in US output. Australian output and 
inflation are consequently lower. This is despite a fall in the Australian real interest rate; 
notwithstanding the initial fall in the domestic inflation rate, the cash rate is lowered to 
combat the decline in the economy and the real interest rate falls.  










The transmission of shocks to the domestic economy via the financial sector is a vital 
characteristic of modern economics. In this model there is some scope to capture this 
through the relationship between AUSQ and USQ, however, it would be desirable to 
vastly extend these linkages to include other asset prices. This may particularly help to 
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analyse the performance of the Australian economy in the 1990s. A shock to USQ is 
transmitted almost one for one into the domestic variable AUSQ. There seem to be strong 
relationships between the financial sectors, reflecting the developed nature of the markets 
and strong financial integration. The result is that Australian output and inflation rise. 
These are accompanied by a strong rise in the domestic cash rate, but insufficient to keep 
the inflation rate from rising above its trend value. The responses are shown in figures 12 
and 13. 





The final international shock to consider is that of an export shock. This can be conceived 
of as an independent increase in demand for Australian exports, due perhaps to a shift in 
tastes. It differs from an increase in export demand induced by generally higher activity 
in the US economy. The export shock induces an appreciation in the domestic currency, 
which is initially transmitted to lower inflation in the domestic economy. However, the 
strong positive effect of higher exports on domestic GDP runs counter to this and 
inflation returns to above trend after the initial period. See figures 14 and 15. The 
domestic cash rate is lifted in order to counter the inflationary pressures in the economy. 
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The impulse responses for the international shocks shown in Figures 6 to 15 indicate the 
transmission of these shocks to the domestic economy. In the next section we consider 
how domestic policy responds to these shocks, and the mitigating role that policy can 
play in protecting the domestic economy from the full  impact of these shocks. 
6.  The Role of Monetary Policy in the Economy 
The monetary policy variable in this model is the Australian cash rate
5. However, 
unanticipated shocks to the cash rate do not include the feedback effects of the rest of the 
economy on cash rates. Here we construct a monetary policy index that includes both the 
feedback and unexpected components as in Dungey and Pagan (2000).  
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The decomposition when all feedback effects are repressed in the model, that is when all 
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5 Unlike other studies we do not find it necessary to include the money supply to obtain appropriate 
monetary policy responses in this model. See for example, Brischetto and Voss (1999) for Australia.  21 
As in Dungey and Pagan (2000) the MPI is constructed as result of subtracting (5) from 
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where eCASH represents the cash rate shock. The results are shown in Figure 16. The solid 
line represents the detrended log GDP, which is the actual data for the period, and the 
lightly dotted line is the monetary policy index. The longer dashed line is the implied 
GDP without the impact of monetary policy over the period. Hence, when the MPI series 
is positive monetary policy is acting to increase output, so that the GDP without 
monetary policy effect would have been lower than the outcome observed. Consider, for 
example, according to Figure 16, that monetary policy in 1994-1995 was acting to 
increase output; the MPI is positive and the GDP without monetary policy line is below 
that of the detrended GDP (roughly speaking the ‘observed data’). This is an interesting 
period as it corresponds with a tightening of monetary policy with a 275 basis point rise 
in the cash rate from mid-1994 to the end of 1995, and a contraction in the MPI may have 
been anticipated. From Figure 16 it is evident that the MPI ceases to rise at the rate prior 
to 1994, and instead adopts a relatively constant stance. That is the policy action seems to 
settle at some expansionary level. The decomposition implies that if this action had not 
been undertaken then the monetary policy index would have been higher and the 
contribution of monetary conditions to GDP output greater. As a caveat to this analysis it 
is worth noting that the model can only capture aspects that are specifically modelled, 
shocks that are not specifically included will be forced into the error terms. And the error 
terms are a component of this decomposition – a point I will return to below.   22 
For the period to 1995 the monetary policy index shown in Figure 16 is very similar to 
that in Dungey and Pagan (2000). As in that paper, there is evidence that monetary policy 
acted to reduce output in the latter half of the 1980s, and that this negative impact was 
sustained somewhat longer than is desirable in the early 1990s recession. For the updated 
data period, the decomposition shows that in the last 5 years of the sample monetary 
policy acted to keep output growth above trend. Although this is probably contrary to 
what many analysts considered the outcome of the policy stance would be, the GDP 
without monetary policy line shows that output would have been clearly below trend until 
1999 in the absence of the policy effects. 
Figure 16: 





In order to present further evidence on the role and composition of monetary policy over 
the period we perform a number of experiments. The experiments involve altering the 
response function of the cash rate, which is the monetary policy instrument in this model. 
It is worth noting at this point that these are designed to deepen our understanding of how 
policy has been acting in the economy, rather than to investigate the effect of alternative 
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policy effect 23 
policies. Alternative policies have been investigated in a somewhat similar manner in 
Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997) who note also the importance of the Lucas critique 
for this style of analysis. This experiment is designed to throw some light on the output 
effects of changing the response function in the VAR. It is not the usual way in which 
researchers usually investigate the impact of inflation targeting, which focuses on the 
outcomes for output and inflation variability rather than level effects as we do here (see 
Gruen (this volume) for comments and de Brouwer and O’Reagan (1997) for an example 
of the more usual style for Australia). Incorporating that style of analysis in the VAR 
structure here is scope for further work. However, this experiment instead throws light on 
the decomposition effects of altering the response parameters – that is the relative flow 
through effects of components when the response function is altered. 




ti t i i t i i t i i t i t
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where εt is a white noise error term. The estimated coefficients for the model presented 
here are given in Table 3
6, in considering these it is worth noting again that the data are in 
log form (with the exception of interest rates and inflation rates) and detrended (with the 
exception of domestic inflation). The recursive order of the system means that the 
exchange rate does not enter contemporaneously into the interest rate equation, 
something which Willard, Voss and Zha (2001) consider may be important in producing 
a good policy reaction function. However, in this analysis the reason for including 
                                                 
6 Real cash rate shocks ensue from nominal cash rate shocks in the model as the sum of 
the coefficients on cash (0.254) exceeds that on inflation (0.182).  24 
exchange rates is as an indicator of import inflation pressures, and the lag structure 
represents the effect of delays in pass through. Recently, pass through has become more 
difficult to see in the Australian data, and although the Reserve Bank has urged caution 
on the inflationary front on the grounds of anticipated inflation from the depreciation of 
the Australian dollar, this does not seem to be eventuating (see also Mishkin and 
Schmidt-Hebbel 2001:10 for other international evidence on pass through). In this event 
it seems unlikely that the contemporaneous exchange rate would have a strong influence 
on the monetary policy reaction. Further investigation of this issue is scope for future 
work. 
Table 3: Parameter estimates for equation (4). 
 CASH  GNE  INF  RTWI 
t     7.752  0.089  n.a. 
t-1 1.042  8.760  -0.085  -1.164 
t-2 -0.362  7.855  0.728  2.686 
t-3 0.154  -10.019  -0.550  -2.476 
 
The means of constructing the MPI shown in Figure 16 is basically to examine the 
responses from a system estimated with the parameter estimates for the lagged values of 
CASHt shown in Table 3, and all other parameters in that equation constrained to zero. 
For the purposes of the new experiments we take the parameter estimates from Table 3 as 
given, and then impose the constraint that one variable at a time is constrained to have  25 
zero parameters. The addition of the feedback effects direct from lagged cash rate 
changes results in a restricted monetary policy index.  
Formally, to obtain the effect of suppressing the response to a particular variable in the 
monetary policy reaction function we set those parameters to zero and re-express the 
effects in similar forms to equations (5) and (6) as shown in equations (8) and (9), where 
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The difference between the two MPI indices is clearly given as (9) and represents the 
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Positive values of ∆t show that more attention to the suppressed variable would have 
resulted in a higher output outcome for the economy.  
This analysis is applied to restricting the system firstly, to not respond to domestic GNE 
and secondly to not respond to domestic inflation. 
Figure 17 shows the MPI indices for the cases where the cash rate is presumed not to 
respond to GNE, denoted MPI
G and where cash does not respond to inflation, denoted 
MPI
P. The gap between the horizontal line and the MPI shows the extent to which the 
policy was contributing to move GDP. MPI observations that are close to the horizontal  26 
line are making little direct contribution. The decompositions of the MPI into MPI
P and 
MPI
G suggest that the majority of the contribution to GDP from monetary policy comes 
from attention paid to GNE. The attention paid to inflation has a lesser effect on output  
(recall the MPI with zero coefficients on inflation is denoted MPI
P). This is in fact 
consistent with the forecast error variance decomposition of Table 1, the largest 
contributor to the short term GDP decomposition other than its own shocks is shocks to 
GNE. The inflation rate makes very little contribution to explaining variance in GDP 
across all horizons. In fact, the MPI
P reflects that there is in fact a substantial role that 
monetary policy controls on inflation have towards explaining the GDP outcome. 










To illustrate the importance of examining the historical decompositions (such as 
presented by the MPIs shown above) the impulse response functions of the VAR with 
restrictions are presented below, in figures 18 to 24. The solid line represents the impulse 
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response functions from the unrestricted system as discussed in Section 5. The dashed 
line represents the impulse response function for the system with the loadings on inflation 
in the cash equation set to zero, and the hatched line represents the functions for the 
system with the loadings on GNE set to zero in the cash equation.  


















1 5 9 13 17 21 25







1 5 9 1 31 72 12 5





1 5 9 13 17 21 25




















A clear feature of these charts is that there are relatively small differences in the impulse 
response functions for the unrestricted system and the system with zero loadings on 
inflation, but relatively large differences with zero loadings on GNE. The reason for this 
is readily apparent from the coefficients reported in Table 3. The coefficients on inflation 
are relatively small, and those on GNE relatively large. This is important in 
understanding the impulse response functions because they represent the response to 
shocks to the error terms in the system only – the derivatives depend on the coefficient 
estimates. So, for example for a three variable, one lag system such as: 
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the impulse response for the third variable in the system (y3t) with respect to a shock in 
the error term for the first equation (ε1t) at period t is given by: 











































Hence if the value of, say, α4 is small, constraining it to zero will have a relatively small 
effect on the impulse response function. However, if α4 is relatively large then the 








The historical decompositions, however, contain further information to the impulse 
responses as they also include the structural error terms from the estimation, see 


















equations (3) to (9) above. They therefore include the effect of the unanticipated 
movements in these variables – as de Brouwer and O’Reagan (1997) note, the smoothing, 
rather than elimination, of fluctuations is the realistic aim of policy. In this case, the 
parameters on the inflation in the cash equation are relatively small and those on GNE 
relatively large. However, the errors in the inflation equation and GNE equation, which 
represent the unexpected shocks, are relatively large and relatively small respectively, as 
shown in Figure 25 (note that each error is on a separate scale). The interaction of these 
shocks with the factor loadings is what results in the analysis of the impact of focussing 
monetary policy more or less on GNE or inflation. 
7.  An International Crisis: the Example of East Asia 
The ability of the Australian economy to largely avoid the ravages of the East Asian 
financial crisis of 1997/98 and continue with relatively strong growth has led some to 
label it an apparent ‘miracle’ (Bean (2000)). The adjustment was not without pain for 
Australian companies and those exposed to the trading sector. However, in general the 
outcome was strong – so much so that the recent RBA volume on the Australian 
economy in the 1990s (Gruen and Shrestha (2000)) finds it unnecessary to devote much 
space to analysing its effects relative to those of internal changes. There was probably an 
element of luck in the timing of this crisis from the Australian point of view. The New 
Zealand economy was entering a recession, which was exacerbated by tighter domestic 
monetary policy in order to protect the exchange rate. In Australia, the rapid depreciation 
of the exchange rate was accommodated. Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) and Ball 
(2000) critically review the two countries' experiences. The combination of the export 
shock and the depreciation of the real TWI are not independent in the outcomes for this  31 
period, and hence what follows is an illustration using estimates from that data period, 
rather than an exact interpretation of the Asian crisis.  
The effect of a negative exogenous export shock in this model can be seen in Figures 26 
and 27. Figure 26 shows the impulse response function for a 0.4% export shock 
according to the full model. The shock takes about 5 years to dissipate and has a 
significant negative effect on real GDP for the first 18 months. Figure 27 shows the 
contribution to real GDP of exports over the period of estimation. The negative impact of 
exports on real GDP is extremely small, and apparent only in the last few years 
observations.  





To throw further light on how the monetary policy settings can aid in dissipating the 
shock to the rest of the economy we consider again the experiments of the previous 
section. In this instance we consider the impact the export shock would have had on 
Australian GDP if the cash equation had not had the form estimated for the entire period. 
Specifically, in separate experiments we set to zero the coefficients in the cash rate 
equation on the inflation rate, and real GNE. The differences between these responses are 
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relatively difficult to see in the forms presented above. So, figure 28 presents the 
difference between the contribution exports make to GDP in the original model, and the 
contribution exports make to GDP in each of the restricted cases. That is: denote the 
contribution of exports as EXP in the unrestricted case, EXP
P for the case where the cash 
rate does not respond to inflation, and EXP
G where the cash rate does not respond to 
GNE. The difference between the restricted and unrestricted cases is as follows; 
  ∆
P = EXP - EXP
P 
  ∆













At the end of the 1990s the contribution of exports to GDP in the unrestricted case was 
negative. If the restricted case results in a more negative contribution of exports to GDP 
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then the quantities ∆
P and ∆
G will be positive – that is the cash rate response acted to 
make GDP higher than it would otherwise have been as a result of limiting the negative 
impact of exports. Alternatively, if ∆
P and/or ∆
G are negative then the cash rate 
responding to those components of the economy resulted in a smaller GDP outcome 
through exports. In the event both ∆
P and ∆
G are positive, indicating that monetary policy 
contributed positively by reacting to both inflation and GNE in this instance. Although 
the reductions shown here may not be large, there is no true counterfactual to assess the 
policy against (see Hamilton and Herrera (2001) for a discussion of this problem in 
VARs). The fact that we can obtain results that support the direction of policy here is 
indicative of the potential strength of these effects.  
9. Conclusion 
The Australian economy is demonstrably affected by international economic conditions 
and unexpected shocks. Economies in this situation have a number of choices. The first, 
and least appealing is to assume that there is nothing that can be done and regard 
domestic policy as ineffective. This has not been the recent Australian experience. More 
attractive is the option of domestic policy designed to recognise the impact international 
shocks can have. And further, to work in such a way as to dissipate those shocks in the 
most favourable way for the domestic economy. This may mean both minimising the 
impact of negative shocks, and also maximising the benefits from favourable shocks. 
Two recent examples stand out in the Australian context. An example of the second is the 
strong favourable impact of declining international prices on domestic inflation over the 
1990s – although it is not clear that this was recognised by policy makers at the time it is  34 
now apparent this was the case (Beechey et al (2000), Dungey and Pitchford (1998, 2000) 
and for a contrary view Dwyer and Leong (2001)). A successful dissipation of a negative 
shock is demonstrated by the negative export shock, similar to that resulting from the 
East Asian crisis, although without incorporating the accompanying depreciation of the 
real exchange rate directly in our analysis.  
The experiments shown here are not meant to minimise the impact of these shocks on 
particular segments of the market. Some sectors are disproportionately hit by 
international shocks. However, domestic policy can act to minimise the damage to the 
economy as a whole. Domestic policy faces two challenges. The first is to correctly 
recognise the impact of international conditions, which includes not falsely attributing 
positive gains to domestic policy, see the discussions in Ball (2000) and Bean (2000) for 
example. This is of course, by no means an easy task. Having achieved that aim the 
challenge for the other arms of domestic policy is then to act to best redistribute the 
impact of international shocks on the individual players, so that the benefits of better 
relations with international conditions accrue more evenly across the community.  
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